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The current international liberal order was initially 
envisioned by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill in the 1941 Atlantic Charter to provide an 
intellectual alternative to National Socialism. Given life by 
Truman, Marshall, Acheson, Schuman and others after the 
war, it spread slowly throughout much of the globe. 
Domestically, that order is about assuring democratic 
transitions, minority rights, free markets, an independent 
judiciary, and freedom of the press. Internationally, it is 
about using rule of law and global institutions rather than 
armed conflict or trade wars to settle international disputes. 
Promoting and defending that order has been America’s 
bipartisan task for more than 70 years, and it has also been 
a transatlantic task. 
The promotion and defense of the international liberal 
order has created strong transatlantic bonds: politically, 
economically and militarily. At present, 26 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 29 members are 
rated by Freedom House (2018) as free, which is the 
highest score of any region in the world; United States 
(US)-European Union (EU) two-way trade in goods and 
services is about USD 1.1 trillion annually with the EU 
being America’s number one customer, supporting about 
2.6 million US jobs. Mutual investment is about USD 5 
trillion, and NATO countries together spend about USD 
900 billion on defense annually while being bound by the 
world’s most successful alliance.  
Yet today there is considerable slippage. Russia and China, 
among others, offer authoritarian nationalism as a model 
that is gaining appeal. The backlash to globalization, 
economic recession and the ‘migration crisis’ has 
stimulated populism in many countries. All this means that 
the US-built liberal international order is now endangered. 
Two recent reports highlight signs of this entropy: first, the 
2018 Munich Security Conference Report, with its subtitle 
“Present at the Erosion: International Order on the 
Brink?”, states that “the pillars of this very order, long 
taken for granted, have come under increasing pressure”. 
Second, the above mentioned Freedom House Report 
concludes that “democracy faced its most serious crisis in 
decades in 2017 as its basic tenets came under attack 
Executive Summary 
> Maintaining transatlantic bonds in an increasingly 
complex and dangerous world is vital to the ‘liberal 
international order’. 
> In light of ongoing slippage in transatlantic 
relations, three alternative futures exist: 
> The continuation of strong US leadership in 
political, security, and economic affairs. This 
future is contingent upon American will and 
European acceptance of US leadership. It does not 
necessarily require a stronger Europe; 
> A more balanced relationship in which Europe 
solidifies, the security burden is more evenly 
balanced, and strong transatlantic trade ties are 
maintained. This future is contingent upon Europe 
fighting centrifugal forces and defending common 
transatlantic values.  
> The erosion of the current transatlantic bonds and 
institutions like NATO. With them could go much 
of the liberal international order. Without these 
institutions Europe would be more vulnerable to 
conflicts and could witness a re-emergence of 
divisive nationalism and more authoritarian 
governments. 
> Given current trends the third outcome could be 
the dangerous default option. To prevent it, 
Europe must be patient as the US struggles with its 
current transition while the US must encourage 
Europe to develop a stronger foreign and security 
capability.  
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around the world”. It noted that last year marked the 
“12th consecutive year in decline in global freedom”. 
Much of that slippage is in the transatlantic space.  
Following an overview of the four periods that have 
sequenced the post-WWII history of transatlantic 
relations, this policy brief suggests three alternative 
futures. It concludes by offering recommendations for a 
more balanced US-EU relationship. 
Looking back 
Since the end of World War II, one can identify four phases 
in transatlantic relations, which can be described through 
the lens of two classical philosophers: Thomas Hobbes and 
Immanuel Kant. Hobbes, an English pessimist, lived during 
the anarchy of the Thirty Years War and the bloody English 
Civil War. He found life of man in its natural state to be 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. He favored a 
strong, and if necessary, authoritarian state to protect its 
citizens. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia enshrined his 
vision, and Europe before 1945 was his world. In contrast, 
Kant, a German optimist, lived through the period of the 
American and French Revolutions. He was the intellectual 
godfather of the liberal international order, championing 
democratic governance, liberty, and international 
cooperation. 
First period: the Cold War 
During the Cold War period, the threat to the West was 
existential – in a Hobbesian sense – both in military and 
ideological terms. Yet, the response of the West was 
Kantian, and involved the promotion of liberal democracy 
within international institutions. America led not only 
because of its economic and military strength but also 
because of its values. The overarching strategy was George 
Kennan’s containment mixed with a European influenced 
detente. The combination worked despite transatlantic 
tensions such as the Suez crisis and efforts to deploy 
Pershing and Cruise Missiles in Europe because the 
Hobbesian threat held the Kantian response together.  
Second period: the post-Cold War era 
The dozen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall might in 
hindsight be considered as a Kantian heyday. The US 
experienced a unipolar moment. The George H.W. Bush 
Administration did a masterful job of setting the stage for 
what the President called ‘the new world order’ by uniting 
Germany peacefully. The Clinton Administration equally 
envisioned a Europe ‘whole, free and at peace’. It 
implemented this vision by championing the enlargement 
of NATO, supporting the EU’s growth, and using military 
force twice to stabilize the Balkans. During this period, 
Huntington (1991) wrote about the third wave of 
democracy, while Fukuyama (1992) saw history ending 
with a victory for the liberal order. 
Third period: after 9/11 
The third period began on 11 September 2001 and lasted 
until about 2014. European sympathy following the 9/11 
attacks soon gave way to transatlantic division as the US 
struggled with two trillion-dollar wars designed for regime 
change and democracy-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Europe contributed heavily to International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan but only 
a select few also participated in Iraq. The US appeared to 
sway back and forth. President George W. Bush 
overextended, while his successor, Barack Obama, may 
have overreacted in the other direction by withdrawing 
prematurely from Iraq. On the economic front, the 2008 
collapse of Lehman Brothers signaled the beginning of 
global recession causing a Euro crisis and stimulating 
populist movements. A Hobbesian understanding of the 
world gained ground again.  
Fourth period: since 2014 
The fourth transatlantic period was triggered by two sets 
of events: Russia’s annexation of Crimea plus its incursions 
into the Donbas region of Ukraine, and the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) victories in Iraq and Syria. Europe 
faced simultaneously new Russian military threats to the 
East, a ‘migration crisis’ in the South, and terrorism in its 
streets. Meanwhile in Asia, China became more assertive 
in the South China Sea and North Korea posed a direct 
nuclear threat to the United States and Europe. While 
Europe became less secure than it arguably was in the 
second and third periods, the United States also changed 
course by electing Donald Trump, who had campaigned 
against elements of the bipartisan system which had 
promoted and defended the international liberal order. 
As this fourth period is still very much ongoing, where do 
things go from here? Will Hobbes dominate? This policy 
brief suggests three alternative futures.  
Three scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations  
Scenario #1: continuation of US leadership 
Some trends will need to change if the United States is to 
continue in its leadership role in transatlantic relations.  
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While Americans are increasingly supportive of NATO 
(62% in a 2017 poll), they are also increasingly tired of 
America carrying such a large burden. By the middle of this 
decade, roughly half of Americans felt that the US had 
failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the US was a declining 
power, and that it should be less active in world affairs 
(Binnendijk 2016: 47). In this context, the Trump 
Administration has not effectively displayed America’s 
ability and willingness to lead coherently. This has been 
highlighted by President Trump’s harsh rhetoric on foreign 
policy, his transactional decision-making, and his broader 
Hobbesian ‘America First’ policy agenda, on which many 
Europeans have expressed concern, and which involved at 
various stages:  
 calling NATO obsolete and hesitating before 
reaffirming the Article 5 commitment,  
 making disparaging remarks about the EU, 
 derailing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership talks,  
 embracing authoritarian figures including Putin,  
 withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate 
change,  
 jeopardizing the Iran nuclear agreement, 
 moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, 
 proposing to build new low-yield nuclear 
weapons, 
 managing the North Korean crisis in an erratic 
fashion, and 
 imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum. 
 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, President Trump’s 
foreign policy agenda for Europe has had some positive 
consequences, mostly in the security domain. The US has 
increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative, 
has re-deployed a third Brigade Combat Team to Eastern 
Europe, and has championed the deployment of NATO 
Battle Groups in the Baltic states and Poland. Support for 
NATO on Capitol Hill is generally strong. Defense spending 
requests are over USD 700 billion. These positive 
developments in 2017 were partly due to the pro-
transatlantic composition of the President’s entourage 
regarding foreign policy issues and trade. Following the 
successive resignations within this entourage, however, 
there is even greater responsibility resting on James 
Mattis’ shoulders at the political level, and on middle level 
managers within the various US departments. This is 
especially true as more protectionist views seem to be 
held now by those in control of US trade policy. 
A fundamental challenge is that European publics and 
many European leaders focus on President Trump’s 
rhetoric and controversial policy initiatives. A recent Pew 
poll shows that only 11% of Germans, 14% of the French, 
and 22% of the British have confidence in President Trump 
(Pew Research Center 2017).  European trust in the United 
States is thus at a historic low. Support for NATO in all 
three countries, however, remains high (60% or higher) 
(Pew/Stokes 2017). Only in Russia and Israel has 
confidence in the US increased.  
European leaders have been careful thus far not to sever 
their relationships with Washington given their 
dependence on the US military and the volume of 
transatlantic trade. Germany’s Chancellor Merkel clearly 
does not have the same personal relationship with 
President Trump as she had with President Obama and has 
said Europe will need to become more independent in 
security matters. At the 2018 World Economic Forum in 
Davos she said that the world needs “more cooperation 
not walls.” French President Macron has a better personal 
relationship with Trump but still calls for greater “strategic 
autonomy,” and at Davos suggested that we should “make 
our planet great again.” The British are silenced by Brexit. 
Scenario # 2: a more balanced relationship 
A more balanced transatlantic relationship would require 
Europe to maintain political cohesion and become more 
self-sufficient in defense, while maintaining strong 
transatlantic political bonds. 
From an institutional perspective, the EU has come a long 
way with a common market, a common currency and fiscal 
policy, a common foreign and security policy, the 
Schengen zone, a High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, a European External Action Service, a 
European Defense Fund, and Permanent Structured 
Cooperation on defense. Yet, Europe is today in a critical 
ideological conflict between Hobbesian forces of 
nationalism, populism and authoritarianism and Kantian 
forces that seek deeper European integration. The 
outcome of that conflict may determine the future 
direction of Europe and the transatlantic relationship. On 
the Hobbesian side are EU members where democracy 
may be imperiled such as Poland and Hungary. They rely 
heavily on NATO militarily but erode the values upon 
which defense commitments have been made.   
Brexit was also stimulated by Hobbesian nationalism. The 
first ‘withdrawal phase’ (financial settlements, citizens’ 
rights, Ireland) of Brexit negotiations has been agreed in 
principle to Britain’s disadvantage. The next phase on 
post-Brexit relations will even be more difficult and will 
determine whether there will be a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit. 
The outcome will be important for European cohesion.  
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The 2017 elections in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands seemed to stem the tide of populism in 
Western Europe. But each country has a growing populist 
problem embodied by Le Pen in France, AfD in Germany, 
and Wilders in the Netherlands. They are now the largest 
opposition party in each of these countries. Germany, 
France and other countries are combating forces of 
disintegration with a more Kantian approach by seeking to 
deepen European integration. For example, they have 
called for a common European budget and a common 
Banking Union. This despite the fact that a major reason 
for the rise of populism in Europe is discontent over 
bureaucracy stemming from Brussels.  
Italy had been part of this pro-European integration group 
until the recent elections. The two anti-establishment 
parties, the eclectic Five Star Movement and the rightist 
(anti-immigrant, anti-EU, pro-Russian) League, together 
won a slight majority of the vote. The old centrist pro-EU 
coalition can no longer rule and the League’s Salvini may 
be asked to form a government. Some pundits are talking 
about Italexit. Others say a new coalition will force the EU 
to reform. It is an open question if the Italian elections will 
shift the European balance in this ‘Hobbes vs Kant conflict’ 
dramatically in a Hobbesian direction. 
On the defense front, an excessive peace dividend since 
1991 has dropped defense spending in Europe to levels 
under 1.5% of GDP. Without US support, European 
militaries would be unable to launch any significant 
defense operations on short notice. The cuts have been 
reversed and European defense spending is up about USD 
28 billion since 2014. Yet only half of NATO’s members 
plan to meet their 2% of GDP defense spending pledge. 
This might raise further concerns about NATO in the US. 
Paradoxically, one thing that might reverse these trends, 
unite Europe and drive up European defense spending is 
the sense that the US is no longer a strong and trustworthy 
partner. 
Scenario #3: erosion of the transatlantic consensus and 
institutions 
Declining US leadership and lack of European cohesion 
may lead to entropy with the erosion of the transatlantic 
consensus and institutions. Is this the default future? 
Encouraging this third future is the strategy of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. Putin has accumulated several 
grievances against the US and its NATO allies that 
exploded during his comments to the Munich Security 
Conference in 2007. These include NATO enlargement, the 
Kosovo War, abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, wars of regime change in Iraq and Libya, support 
for the colored revolutions in Eurasia, and democracy 
promotion in Russia. Most are not justified. In reaction to 
these grievances, the Kremlin has invaded Georgia and 
Ukraine, supported Assad in Syria, dramatically increased 
defense spending, and launched what some have called 
hybrid warfare against the West.  
As part of this effort, President Putin recently highlighted 
four weapons systems designed to circumvent American 
ballistic missile defenses. In reality US missile defense are 
totally unable to defeat a Russian second strike capability. 
In terms of hybrid warfare, vigorous disinformation 
campaigns were designed on multiple media platforms to 
disrupt and divide. One manifestation of the latter 
campaign was Russian interference in the 2016 US 
presidential campaign and in subsequent European 
elections. Putin’s efforts to divide the transatlantic 
partners and promote authoritarian populism in Europe 
has fallen on fertile soil in some countries. His targeting of 
Russian minorities in the Baltic States and sparking unrest 
in the Balkans is particularly dangerous. 
The key institution needed to stem Russia’s plan is NATO, 
which can help the liberal international order survive. 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent 
threats against NATO have actually been a major factor in 
solidifying the Alliance. NATO has strong civilian leadership 
and an unparalleled unified military command. It has 
expanded its focus to deal with a broad array of security 
challenges, including cyber and terrorism. Recent summits 
statements in Wales and Warsaw were clear about the 
new Russian challenge, although not all NATO nations 
share the immediacy of that threat. Significant steps have 
since been taken to enhance NATO’s deterrence posture 
and  a “prompt reinforcement” initiative is expected for 
the July 2018 Brussels Summit to supplement them.   
Conclusions and recommendations 
Out of these three futures, the first one may not be 
sustainable, while the third one would be disastrous for 
transatlantic relations. Evolving towards some version of 
the second future will therefore be necessary, albeit 
difficult. 
Transatlantic bonds rest on three pillars: common values 
and policy approaches, relatively free trade, and the NATO 
Alliance. The first two pillars have been damaged and the 
third is under pressure. To reverse these trends and move 
towards the second future, transatlantic partners will 
need to work on several tracks. 
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• European leaders need to remember that despite 
current populist tendencies in Washington, broader 
American values still underpin the liberal international 
order they seek to preserve.  
• American leaders in both political parties need to speak 
out against the authoritarian ideas in Europe that seek to 
undermine the American-built order that has provided 
peace and prosperity for seven decades.  
• Both sides of the Atlantic need to double down on NATO 
and underpin it with greater European defense spending. 
• Trade wars can destroy a partnership. Trade disputes 
should be settled by preserving the World Trade 
Organization and by re-engaging the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership negotiations, not by levying 
unilateral tariffs and inviting retaliation. 
Will Hobbes or Kant prevail? The stakes are high. If the 
consequences are understood, leaders can find a path to a 
balanced transatlantic outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further Reading 
 
Binnendijk, H., Friends, Foes, and Future Directions, Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, Washington D.C., 
2018. 
Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1992. 
Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Report 2018: To the 
Brink – and Back?, Munich, February 2018. 
Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes and Trends, Washington, 
D.C., 26 June 2017. 
Stokes, B., NATO’s Image Improves on Both Sides of Atlantic, 
Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 23 May 2017. 
--- 
This policy brief is based on the High-Level Lecture on “The Future 
of Transatlantic Relations” that the author delivered on 22 March 
2018 at the College of Europe in Bruges. The lecture was 
organized in the framework of the Master of Arts in Transatlantic 
Affairs  (MATA) programme, jointly offered by the College of 
Europe and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University. 
--- 
 
Views expressed in the College of Europe Policy Briefs are those 
of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect positions of 
either the series editors or the College of Europe. Free online 
subscription at www.coleurope.eu/CEPOB. 
About the Author 
  
